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The Influence of Elections on the Accounting Choices of Governmental Entities 
 
Abstract
 
This paper investigates whether gubernatorial elections affect state governments’ accounting 
choices. We identify two accounts, the compensated absence liability account and the unfunded 
pension liability account, which provide incumbent gubernatorial candidates with flexibility for 
manipulation. We find that in an election year, the liability associated with compensated 
absences and unfunded pension liabilities are both systematically lower. We also find that the 
variation in these employment related liabilities is correlated with proxies for the incumbent’s 
incentives and ability to manipulate their accounting reports.  Jointly these results suggest that 
state governments manipulate accounting numbers to present a healthier financial picture in an 
election year. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper investigates whether political events affect accounting choices made by U.S. 
states in the preparation of their annual financial statements. Historically, when incumbents run 
for reelection, the fiscal performance of the governmental entity during their term is an 
important part of the election platform.  For example, Brender [2003] finds evidence that fiscal 
performance influences the outcome of mayoral election results in Israel during the 1990’s.1 
Brender and Drazen [2008] build on this result providing evidence that in democracies, 
incumbents increase their probability of re-election by 7-9% if they increase the surplus to GDP 
ratio by 1%. These results raise an interesting issue: do incumbents manage the outputs of the 
governmental financial reporting system to influence the outcome of elections? 
To answer this question, we focus on gubernatorial general elections during the period 
2000-2008. We collect state level financial data and search through the financial reports to 
identify accounts in which the accounting standards provide gubernatorial candidates with 
sufficient flexibility to allow for manipulation. Since states follow governmental accounting, 
there are no profit and loss statements. Thus we instead focus on state deficits and attempt to 
identify accounts that will impact this difference.  This choice is consistent with Brender and 
Drazen’s [2008] observation that “voters, especially in developed countries and established 
democracies, do not like deficits.” 
While there are a variety of potential candidate accounts, we ultimately focus on 
liabilities associated with the state’s work force. Specifically, our main analysis focuses on the 
liability associated with compensated absences, and in supplemental tests we examine the 
                                                 
1 Similarly, Peltzman [1992] finds that in state governor elections, the proportion of votes received by the incumbent 
governor’s party is affected by measures of the states’ fiscal performance.  In particular, he finds in states that spend 
more the incumbent’s party receives a disproportionately smaller share of votes. In a cross-country study, Alesina et 
al. [1998] find consistent evidence that voters value responsible fiscal policies.  
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liability associated with unfunded pension liabilities (i.e., unfunded actuarial accrued liability or 
UAAL). We believe that focusing on specific accounts, and in particular these two accounts, has 
several advantages.  For example, both of these liabilities are relatively large and provide 
preparers with an opportunity to use discretion.  We find that the compensated absence account 
balance is roughly 3% of the average state’s total liabilities, and over four times of the average 
state’s general fund balance. The magnitude of the unfunded pension liability is even larger. It is 
on average 57% of a state’s total liabilities and over 90 times of a state’s general fund balance. 
In addition, by focusing on specific accounts, we develop relatively better models of the non-
discretionary portion of the account balances, and obtain less noisy measures of the extent to 
which an entity has engaged in earnings management.2  
Our primary hypothesis is that the discretionary components of the liabilities associated 
with compensated absences and unfunded pension will be smaller (more negative) in the fiscal 
year prior to an election. We also conjecture that the extent of the accounting discretion used in 
an election year will also depend on the incumbent parties’ incentives and ability to manipulate 
their financial reports. Specifically, states in relatively poor financial health or states with strict 
budget restrictions have stronger incentives to use discretion to reduce their liabilities; as these 
states have stronger incentives to improve the voter’s perception of the incumbent and will be 
reluctant to cut spending or increase taxes in an election year to meet the budget requirement.  
We expect the incumbent parties’ ability to manipulate accounting information in an 
election year will be smaller for states with more independent state audit agencies and more 
independent state controllers.3 We use whether state auditors (controllers) are elected by citizens 
                                                 
2 See McNichols and Wilson [1988] for a similar discussion in the context of provision for bad debts. 
3 For most states, state auditors conduct audits of the state’s annual reports. Even if they do not conduct a traditional 
financial audit of the annual report (such as Delaware), state auditors are still responsible for evaluating the state’s 
fiscal accountability.  Different states have different names for their state audit agencies. For example, for Alabama 
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or appointed by state governments as a proxy for auditor (controller) independence. We argue 
that state auditors who are elected are more likely to conduct high quality audits and thus less 
likely to afford the state government discretion. Similarly, we expect elected controllers to be 
more independent and less likely to prepare biased financial reports. 
To provide evidence on these hypotheses, we obtain information on the liability 
associated with compensated absences, unfunded pension liabilities, state payrolls, elections, 
auditors, controllers, and other control variables from several public data sources (detailed 
below) over the period 2000-2008. We first develop a measure of the extent to which the 
liability for compensated absences has been manipulated by modeling the change in this account 
balance as a function of the change in the payroll for the state’s full-time employees, changes in 
the state’s employee benefit policies, and a series of control variables. The residuals from this 
regression reflect the unexplained change, and serve as our measure of the “discretionary” 
portion of this liability. We then investigate the extent to which the discretionary portion of the 
account balance varies with our hypothesized determinants.  In the supplementary analysis 
section, we conduct a similar test for the unfunded pension liability.4 
Focusing on our primary analysis on the compensated absence liability, we find that the 
change in state payrolls and our measures of changes in employment policies are statistically 
significant and correlated with the change in the compensated absence liability in the 
hypothesized direction. In particular, we find that compensated absences liability tends to 
increase when state employee payroll increases and the account balance tends to decrease when 
                                                                                                                                                             
the audit agency is called Department of Examiners of Public Accounts. For Indiana, it is called State Board of 
Accounts. For brevity, we will henceforth collectively call these agencies state auditors.  
4 The control variables we select in determining the “normal” or unmanipulated portion of each of these accounts 
vary as we expect that there are different economic forces that shape these liabilities.  For example, the unfunded 
pension liability is likely to be affected by changes in return on pension assets, while these returns will have no 
effect on the compensated absence account balance.   
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the state has potentially employed policies to reduce employee benefits. The model explains a 
significant portion of the variation in compensated absences liability, and so the residuals are 
reasonable estimates for the discretionary components of the account.  
In support of our primary hypothesis, we find that the discretionary component of the 
change in compensated absences is smaller in the fiscal year right before a gubernatorial 
election. Compared to a non-election year, state governments on average abnormally accumulate 
$23.9 million dollars less in compensated absences in an election year. This is consistent with 
state government using accounting discretion to reduce liability balances before an election to 
present a healthier financial look of the state.  
We also find results that are consistent with our hypotheses that the extent of accounting 
manipulation in an election year is associated with the governor’s incentives and ability to 
manipulate accounting information. The manipulation in compensated absence liability is larger 
in states that expect to have poorer financial health and in states that have stricter balance budget 
requirements. We also find that states will be less likely to use accounting discretion in an 
election year when the state has independent controllers or auditors.  
As we mention above, we conduct a set of supplemental tests on the liability associated 
with unfunded pension obligations.  Since our primary analysis focuses on a specific account, we 
include these supplemental analyses to reduce the concerns that we are capturing a correlated 
omitted variable in our primary analysis. Specifically, we develop a model of the non-
discretionary portion of the unfunded pension liability and use the residual from this regression 
as our alternative measure of accounting discretion. Consistent with the findings in compensated 
absences liability, we find that state governments make accounting choices to reduce unfunded 
pension liability in election years. Relative to non-election years, states on average recognize 
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$474 million dollars less in unfunded pension in election years. The extent to which such 
accounting discretion is used is correlated with both of our measures of the incumbent’s ability 
to use accounting discretion and one of our measures of the incumbent’s incentives to use 
accounting discretion (expected fiscal performance). We find that our proxy for the strictness of 
the balanced budget requirements is not significant in this analysis.  The mixed results on this 
variable are likely to be attributable to the difficulty in measuring the extent to which states have 
balanced budget requirements, and thus we caution the interpretation of this variable. Overall, 
the results of the supplementary analysis on unfunded pension are consistent with our main tests, 
reducing concerns that we are simply capturing correlated omitted variables. 
Our findings that elections influence outcomes of state financial reporting processes 
closely relates to two streams of literature. The first investigates accounting choices in state and 
local governments. Most of this literature focuses on the general accounting practices of the 
governments. For example, Zimmerman [1977] examines the determinants of the diverse 
municipal accounting practices in the 1970s. Evans and Patton [1983] identify economic 
incentives that lead to cities voluntarily providing high quality accounting. Baber [1983], Baber 
and Sen [1984], and Ingram [1984] argue that the cross-sectional variations in public sector 
accounting and auditing practices reflect demands for better monitoring. Evans and Patton 
[1987] provide counter evidence, suggesting that signaling is the main reason for the diversity of 
governmental financial reporting quality. Our paper adds to the literature suggesting that political 
incentives influence the outputs of the financial reporting process of state governments. 
The second stream of research examines accounting choices and political costs. Watts 
and Zimmerman [1978] argue that large firms are more visible and thus subject to adverse 
political actions. To reduce political costs, firms select accounting procedures to minimize 
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reported earnings. Jones [1991] examines firms’ accounting choices during import relief 
investigations, providing evidence that firms manage earnings downward to increase the 
likelihood of obtaining import relief. Ramanna and Roychowdhury [2010] find outsourcing firms 
with ties to candidates in the 2004 Congressional elections use income-decreasing accruals in the 
periods immediately preceding the election. They argue that corporate donors manage earnings 
downward to avoid negative political scrutiny over outsourcing. Similarly, Chaney et al. [2011] 
and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee [2006] suggest that the extent to which firms are politically 
connected affects their accounting report quality and source of financing. By studying how 
elections affect the accounting choices made in the public sector, we add another dimension to 
the literature investigating the connection between political processes and accounting. 
In conclusion, our paper offers an important next step in both the broad accounting 
choice literature, and more specifically, in the political cost hypothesis within this literature. The 
literature on accounting choices largely focuses on private sector enterprises. Given the recent 
heightened concerns over states fiscal performance, it seems reasonable to extend this literature 
to the outputs of the state financial reporting process. We suggest that our paper adds to this 
literature by identifying specific accounts likely to be manipulated prior to an election, and by 
investigating factors likely to affect state governments’ accounting choices.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides background information 
on governmental accounting and the accounting for compensated absences. Section 3 develops 
hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the data and the model of the discretionary component of 
compensated absences. Section 5 provides our main results and Section 6 provides robustness 
tests.  Section 7 provides a supplementary analysis on unfunded pension obligations and Section 
8 concludes the paper.  
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2. Background 
2.1 The role of financial reporting for state governments 
 Established in 1984, the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is the 
primary authority for setting financial reporting standards for governmental entities, including 
states, cities, towns, villages, school districts, and public utilities. GASB’s first concepts 
Statement, Objectives of Financial Reporting, sets the foundation of governmental financial 
reporting in the United States. The Statement states, “Financial reports are used primarily to 
compare actual financial results with the legally adopted budget; to assess financial condition 
and results of operations; to assist in determining compliance with finance-related laws, rules, 
and regulations; and to assist in evaluating efficiency and effectiveness.” (GASB, 1987) 
Therefore, governmental accounting emphasizes accountability rather than profitability. 
In this paper, consistent with the GASB’s objectives, we focus on the role of the financial 
statements as a tool for citizens to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of elected officials, 
like state governors. Since public scrutiny is most intense during elections, outputs from the 
state’s financial reporting process are likely to affect citizens’ votes. We argue that, in election 
years, parties in power have incentives to make accounting choices to “paint a rosy picture” and 
to improve voter’s perceptions of the fiscal performance of the state.5  Reporting surpluses or 
reducing deficits is likely to increase the odds that the party in power will remain in power.   
We are less sanguine on the exact mechanism through which the improved fiscal 
performance enters into the voter’s decision process when casting his or her vote.  That is, news 
agencies, ratings agencies, and the candidates themselves are all likely to be sources of 
                                                 
5 This is not to suggest that this is the only role the financial reports play.  For example, Copeland and Ingram 
[1982], Raman [1981, 1982], Wallace [1981], Wescott [1984], Wilson and Howard [1984], Gore [2004], Gore et al. 
[2004], and Baber and Gore [2008] all suggest that a governmental entity’s financial reports play an important role 
in creditors evaluation of the credit quality of their public debt.  A state’s financial reports are also likely to play a 
role in resource allocation issues, and as a control mechanism, to determine compliance with federal or state laws. 
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information regarding the fiscal performance of the state, and it is not clear which of these are 
important, or which is relatively more important.  Future research might consider addressing 
these questions.  In this paper, we focus on whether politicians take accounting actions to 
improve the fiscal performance of the state in an election year. 
2.2. Accounting rules for states, and specific rules for compensated absences  
 
Per GASB Statement No. 34, state governments are required to annually provide 
government-wide financial statements. State governments fulfill these requirements by reporting 
their operating results annually in a Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR). The 
CAFR displays a broad overview of the state’s financial condition as a single unified entity. The 
CAFR consists of the statement of activities, a statement of net assets, and a series of fund 
statements.6 The statement of net assets reports all financial and capital resources of the state 
after accounting for its liabilities, the statement of activities shows how net assets changed 
during the fiscal year, and the fund statements report revenues and expenditures for specific 
governmental units. It is from these financial statements that we obtain information on the 
liability associated with compensated absences. 
Our primary tests focus on the liability associated with compensated absences.  This 
liability represents the dollar value of the employees rights to unused vacation time, unused sick 
time, or unused other leave time that can be converted into monetary benefits upon employment 
separation.7 GASB Statement No. 16, Accounting for Compensated Absences, provides guidance 
for state governments on how to account for these liabilities. The underlying principle of GASB 
                                                 
6 Fund statements report the operating results of three fund groups--governmental, proprietary, and fiduciary. 
Proprietary and fiduciary funds are prepared using full accrual accounting, while governmental fund financial 
statements have a short-term focus and are prepared using modified accrual basis of accounting.  
7 The types of compensated absences covered by GASB 16 include: vacation leave, sick leave, sabbatical leave, and 
any other compensatory leaves, as well as any other fringe benefits, and other compensation costs that are directly 
associated with the employees’ salary (e.g., the employers’ portion of Medicare costs, employer provided life 
insurance, and pension obligations). 
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16 is that employers should accrue a liability for compensated absences that is attributable to 
services already rendered and is not contingent upon a specific event that is beyond the control of 
both the employer and the employee.8 Compensated absences liabilities generally should be 
recorded based on the pay or salary rates in effect at the balance sheet date.  
To determine the liability associated with compensated absences, the state is required to 
make a variety of estimates that will affect the relative size of the liability. For example, to 
estimate the liability for sick leave, GASB 16 permits a state government to use either the 
termination payment method or the vesting method. Under the termination payment method, a 
state government accrues the liability for sick leave payments only to the extent that “it is 
probable that the employer will compensate the employees for the benefits through cash 
payments conditioned on the employees' termination or retirement.” Alternatively, under the 
vesting method, a state government estimates the liability for sick leave payouts for “those 
employees who currently are eligible to receive termination payments as well as other employees 
who are expected to become eligible in the future to receive such payments.” Therefore, 
depending on the accounting option the state selects, the liability for sick leave depends on 
several estimations, including: the probability that the benefits will result in termination 
payments; the probability that current ineligible employees will become eligible to receive 
payments at termination; the likelihood that the employees who are eligible to receive payments 
will eventually receive those payments (rather than use accumulated leave, accumulate too much 
leave, waive payments in exchange for other consideration, etc.). Furthermore, states also have to 
make assumptions about how employees use their accumulated sick leave. For example, are 
employees using the sick leave they most recently accumulated (LIFO approach), or the sick 
                                                 
8 Examples of leaves attributable to events outside the control of employees and employers include jury duty, 
military leave, potential sick leave because of illness or other medical related reasons, etc.  
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leave they accumulated 10 years ago (FIFO approach). All these assumptions affect the 
magnitude of the account balance.9  Similar discretion exists with vacation leave and sabbatical 
leave. 
As Ruppel [2010] indicates, “The calculation of the liability for compensated absences 
can be very complicated for governmental entities.” He indicates that in state governments there 
are often various groups of employees that are working under various union contracts and have a 
wide range of benefits and as compensated absence benefits are changed, long term employees 
are often “grandfathered” into their old plans. These plan differences are compounded by 
governmental entities having lots of employees, and computer systems that are incapable of 
tracking leave balances. Ruppel [2010] concludes that “the compensated absence liability is 
subject to the use of estimates and historical payment patterns to determine reasonable liability 
amounts. Sometimes a sample of employees is taken, liabilities are calculated in detail, and the 
results are extrapolated to the workforce as a whole.” He further cautions that governmental 
entities can spend an inordinate amount of time and costs to develop a precise estimate of this 
balance, and governmental entities may be better served by developing a reasonable estimate. 
In addition to the inherent discretion that the GASB provides in determining the amount 
of this liability, the nature of the financial reporting process for state entities provides an 
additional layer of discretion for state governments. States typically don’t have a regulator, like 
the SEC, monitoring their financial reporting process.  It is not clear that states can be sued for 
                                                 
9 Some states also allow employees to transfer their sick leave to other employees, and some states have restrictions 
on how many sick days may be accrued, and the rate at which employees can cash out their unused sick leave. For 
example, Alabama only allows employees to accumulate up to a maximum of 150 days sick leave. Moreover, 
employees can only be compensated for 1/2 of the maximum accrued sick leave upon retirement from state service. 
In addition, in many states employees have the option of converting any unused portion of their compensated 
absence balances into credits increasing their retirement benefits, and/or post employment health benefits. States that 
provide these options must estimate the amount of unused compensated absences that are likely to be converted into 
retirement benefits, and then determine the actuarial value of those benefits, and recognize the unfunded portion of 
those benefits as a compensated absence liability, providing additional accounting discretion.  
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accounting irregularities.  In a recent article in the New York Times, the New York State 
Comptroller, Thomas DiNapoli, indicated that the state’s balance sheet is unreliable, as the state 
routinely manipulated which costs were included or excluded from the general fund, and delayed 
liability/expense recognition.10  Thus in addition to using the accounting discretion afforded to 
the state under the standard, states can also distort the compensated absence liability account by 
simply not recognizing changes in the value of the liability. 
In Table 1, Panel A, we report descriptive information regarding the size of the 
compensated absence liability. In every year in every state that we are able to locate the state’s 
financial statements (over the period 2000 – 2008), the liability for compensated absences is 
always sufficiently large enough that it is reported as its own separate line item. We find that for 
the average state, the liability is almost 5 times of the state’s general fund balance, suggesting 
that this liability is a significant component of the state’s fiscal performance. 
Summarizing, we focus on the accounting discretion used by state governments for the 
compensated absence liability account. We focus on this account because it is both relatively 
large, and the accounting rules that govern this account (i.e. GASB 16) provide state 
governments opportunities to exercise discretion. By focusing on a specific account, we increase 
our ability to isolate the non-discretionary portion of the account balance, and increase the power 
of our tests, but we sacrifice the comprehensiveness of our study (McNichols and Wilson 
[1988]). We suggest that the manipulation associated with this liability is likely to be one portion 
of the total manipulation in the financial statements. If we fail to find results, this does not allow 
us to conclude that there are not other potentially large accounting manipulations. Similarly, if 
we do find results, we believe that our study provides a lower bound on the extent of the 
                                                 
10 For a copy of the article see: http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/albany-accounting-hides-deficit-size-
comptroller-says/?src=mv 
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manipulation, as other accounts are also likely to be manipulated. We recognize that there are 
tradeoffs associated with this choice, but we ultimately choose to reduce the comprehensiveness 
of our approach in favor of a more accurate measure and powerful test. 
3. Hypothesis Development  
 We expect the presence of a gubernatorial general election to affect a state government’s 
discretionary accounting choices. State governors are accountable for their states’ fiscal 
performance and public scrutiny is especially intense during a gubernatorial election year. The 
electoral fate of the incumbent governor (or in cases where the incumbent does not run, the 
nominee of the incumbent governor’s party) is likely to be influenced by the state’s financial 
performance in the year leading up to the election.11 Therefore, we expect that gubernatorial 
elections provide incentives for politicians to make accounting choices that would imply an 
overall healthy financial condition of the state. 
This hypothesis is not without tension.  For example Van Lent [2011] argues that elected 
officials have incentives to be transparent and that these incentives are potentially greater than 
the incumbent’s incentives to manipulate the state’s accounting reports.  Ultimately, like most 
earnings management research, whether elected officials will manipulate the state’s accounting 
reports in an election year depends on the benefits of the manipulation (an increased probability 
of the incumbent being elected and the incumbent’s party retaining political power) and the costs 
of those manipulations (reduction in transparency and reputational costs if manipulations are 
discovered and revealed). 
We further hypothesize that the extent to which politicians employ accounting discretion 
in an election year is conditioned by their incentives and their ability to use accounting 
                                                 
11 We check our sample to ensure that the candidates for the gubernatorial elections have influence on the states’ 
financial statements. In our data there are 92 election-years. We find that the incumbent governor, the lieutenant 
governor, or a member of the governor’s cabinet ran in 79 of the 92 elections.  
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discretion. The first incentive we consider is the state’s budget flexibility. Unlike the federal 
government, most states are constitutionally prohibited from running deficits and the stringency 
of this requirement varies by state.12 States with rigorous budget restrictions have stronger 
incentives to employ accounting practices to ensure expenditures do not exceed revenues, as the 
alternative is to cut expenditures or increase taxes. Governors would prefer not to cut 
expenditures or increase taxes, as Poterba [1994] finds that state spending cuts and tax increases 
affect voters’ choices in election years. In contrast, states with weak restrictions can use other 
fiscal techniques to run deficits or carry deficits forward to future fiscal years, and thus have 
fewer incentives to use accounting manipulations. 
The second incentive we consider is the state’s expected financial health. Prior studies 
(e.g., Brender and Drazen [2008], Brender [2003], and Peltzman [1992]) find that voters hold 
politicians accountable for the government’s fiscal health. These results suggest that politicians 
in states that are expected to have relatively poorer fiscal performance will have stronger 
incentives to use accounting discretion to appear healthier. Thus, we predict that states that are 
expected to be less healthy during the period leading up to an election have stronger incentives to 
engage in accounting manipulations to attract votes. 
In addition to the incumbent party’s incentives to use accounting discretion, we also 
consider factors affecting their ability to use discretion. The first factor we consider is the state 
auditor's independence. Federal law requires states to conduct annual audits of their financial 
statements and internal control systems. States vary considerably in how they select their 
auditors. The position may be independently elected, appointed by the legislature, appointed by 
the governor, or jointly appointed. Hence, personnel who conduct the audit may be independent, 
or may be employees of the state who report directly to the governor or to the legislature. We 
                                                 
12 All states except Vermont have balanced budget restrictions that curtail the use of deficit spending. 
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conjecture that auditors who are directly elected by citizens are more independent and are more 
likely to offer higher audit quality.13 Compared to appointed auditors, the elected auditors are 
more likely to hinder a politician’s ability to adopt favorable accounting treatment during an 
election year. 
Finally, we suggest that the independence of the state controller (i.e. the financial 
statement preparer) will also affect a politician’s ability to use accounting discretion in an 
election year.14 The state controller is the agency that chooses the accounting principles to 
follow. We expect more independent controllers to be less likely to produce biased financial 
statements. Similar to state auditors, we conjecture that elected preparers are more likely to be 
independent and thus less likely to engage in earnings management during an election year.15 
4. Modeling the Discretionary Accounting Choices Related to Compensated Absences 
 
4.1 Research design 
 To test our hypotheses, we focus on the accounting choices states make when recognizing 
liabilities associated with state employees.  State governments primary liabilities are the bonds 
and other long-term debt instruments that are used to finance public works, and the liabilities 
associated with the employment benefits they offer to their work force.  Since there is very little 
accounting discretion in long-term debt, we focus on the liabilities associated with the state’s 
                                                 
13 For example, in April 2004 the year of their gubernatorial election, the elected state auditor for Washington 
released a report detailing 60 financial reporting problems at 18 different state agencies totaling $3.5 billion dollars 
in questioned costs.  See “Opinion - In Our View: Dollars MIA; Auditor's 60 findings among government agencies 
add up to millions lost, missing” by Columbian editorial writers in the April 19, 2004 issue of the Columbian. 
14 We use the word controller to describe the head of the agency that is responsible for preparing the state’s financial 
statements. For example, California’s State Controller’s Office is responsible for preparing California’s financial 
statements. California Government Code Section 12460 and 12461 require that the Controller prepare the annual 
report in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. The actual name 
of this agency varies by state. For example, in contrast to California, in Kansas the Department of Administration, 
Division of Accounts and Reports prepares for the financial statements. 
15 Ideally, we would also capture whether the controller or the auditor is in the same party as the governor.  
Unfortunately, we can only observe the party affiliation of elected auditors and elected controllers.  In the sensitivity 
analysis, we attempt to measure this effect, but the small sample size hinders the analysis.  
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work force.  Our primary analysis focuses on the liability associated with compensated absences.  
We also conduct supplemental tests examining the unfunded pension liability. 
To measure the accounting discretion associated with compensated absences, we model 
the change in the compensated absence balance. We only consider compensated absence 
liabilities that are associated with the primary state government and exclude those related to 
component units. Component units are organizations legally separate from the state government 
(e.g., universities, public hospitals, utility companies, etc.). Since component units have separate 
governance and are legally different entities from the state government, we conjecture that the 
state governments are unable to manage the accounting numbers associated with these units. In 
addition, the nature of component units varies drastically across states and it is difficult to gather 
detailed data on the precise composition of component units in each state. Therefore, comparing 
state operations becomes difficult if component units are included in the analysis.16 
Since the higher the employees’ pay, the more the state needs to accrue compensated 
absences, we expect the change in compensated absences to be positively associated with the 
change in the employee payrolls. We also expect that the change in the amount of compensated 
absences will depend on the change in the economic conditions of the state (measured using 
GDP growth). States that are performing better are expected to grant more benefits. Moreover, 
we expect the change in the compensated absence balance will depend on whether the state 
changes their policies on granting compensatory leave. For example, when a state faces financial 
difficulties, the government may cut employee benefits, reducing vacation and sick leave 
                                                 
16 State universities are a good example of the complexities that arise with component units.  Most states have state 
universities and they are generally reported as separate component units in the state’s CAFR.  The extent to which 
the state is involved in the running of the universities varies considerably.  In some states, the state government has 
considerable authority over the university, accounting for a substantial portion of the universities budget.  Other 
states are less so.  Measuring the extent to which a state influences the university is very difficult, and thus we 
exclude component units from our analysis.  
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benefits. Ideally, we would directly control for the affect of this change in policy in the model. 
Unfortunately, a state’s policies on compensated absences are hard to observe. While some states 
disclose some information on their policies on CAFRs (e.g., Alabama, Kansas, Colorado), most 
states do not.  
To capture any policy change, we develop two instruments.  The first is based on the 
survey data from National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). The NASBO surveys 
provide annual data on whether a state government has used furloughs or early retirements to 
reduce or eliminate budget gaps. We conjecture that the greater the extent to which a state uses 
these strategies the more likely it is that the government will cut employee benefits such as 
compensated absences.  Our second instrument is designed to measure the extent to which there 
are drops in employees’ pay due to a policy change. We conjecture that when a state employs 
policies to cut employees’ pay, it is likely that the state will also cut other benefits like 
compensated absences. Since the number of the employees is the main factor affecting the state 
employee pay, we proxy the salary cut due to a policy change using the residuals from a 
regression of the annual change in full time pay (scaled by total assets) on the change in the 
number of full time employees (scaled by total assets).17 
Finally, we control for the size of the state.  Although we scale the dependant and some 
of the independent variables by the state’s total assets to control for the scale of the state 
government and to reduce the heteroscedasticity in the error term, we also include size as a 
control to reduce the possibility that our results are simply capturing a scale effect. 
Our model takes the form: 
                                                 
17 We find that the correlation between the change in full time pay and the change in the number of full time 
employees is 99% and the adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.97. These results confirm that the number of employees 
is the main determinant for the employee payroll. Any unexplained portion from the regression is likely driven by 
factors such as policy changes. 
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ΔCAi,t = α0 + α1ΔFTPayrolli,t + α2Policyi,t + α3UnexpectedCompi,t + 
α4GrowthGDPi,t + α5LogTAi,t + εi,t                                                         (1) 
 
where i indexes state and t indexes year. ΔCA is the annual change in primary government 
compensated absences scaled by primary government total assets. ΔFTPayroll is the annual 
change in average base monthly pay for full-time state employees scaled by primary government 
total assets. We focus on full-time employees because part-time employees usually are not 
eligible for compensated absences.18 Policy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the state uses 
furloughs or early retirements to reduce budget gaps. UnexpectedComp is the residual from a 
regression of a state’s annual change in full time pay (ΔFTPayroll) on the change in the number 
of full time employees (both scaled by the primary government total assets). GrowthGDP is 
growth in the state’s gross domestic product per capita. LogTA is the log of the primary 
government total assets.   
 We estimate equations (1) by pooling all data over the sample period. The residual from 
the regression is the estimate for state i year t’s discretionary compensated absence account. 
Since we are running a full panel, in all our analyses we cluster standard errors by state and by 
year to correct for possible correlations across observations of a given state and of a given year 
(Rogers [1993], Petersen [2009]). Appendix I lists detailed variable definitions. 
4.2 Sample description 
 Our sample period covers the fiscal years beginning in 2000 through 2008. We use 
several public data sources to construct the sample. We collect state governments’ accounting 
data from each state’s CAFR. We obtain the reports from each state government’s website. A 
few states do not provide a full time series CAFRs on their websites (e.g., Arizona’s General 
                                                 
18 Some state governments may provide certain amount of compensated absences to permanent (as opposed to 
temporary or contract) part-time employees, but at a different rate from full-time employees. Since, the data on the 
payrolls of permanent part-time employees are unavailable from the U.S. Census Bureau, we cannot control for this 
effect in the model.   
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Accounting Office publishes CAFR starting from 2002). These states have shorter sample 
periods. We collect state employment data from the U.S. Census Bureau Census of Government 
Employment. We collect state Gross Domestic Product data from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
and state population data from the U.S. Census Bureau. We collect a state’s fiscal strength data 
from NASBO surveys. NASBO conducts surveys each year and obtains information on the 
states’ actual and forecasted revenues, expenditures, ending general fund balances, and budget 
stabilization fund balances. After requiring non-missing data, our final sample for the 
compensated absence analysis has 359 state-year observations. Of the 359 observations, 92 are 
gubernatorial election years and 267 are non-election years.  
For the 92 election state-year observations, we ensure that all the states’ fiscal year ends 
are prior to the general election so that all the accounting information is observable to voters at 
the election. All gubernatorial elections in our sample are held in November. Two state-year 
observations have fiscal year ends in March; all the rest observations have fiscal year ends in 
June.19  
4.3 Descriptive statistics on compensated absences 
 Table 1 Panel A reports descriptive information on the variables used in estimating the 
discretionary component of the change in compensated absences. The average compensated 
absences liability for the states in our sample is $336 million dollars. This is on average over 4 
times of the states’ general fund balance, and almost 1.5 times the sum of the general fund 
balance and budget stabilization fund (i.e., rainy day fund) balance.20 We also find that, on 
average, compensated absences account for 3% of the state government’s total liabilities and 
                                                 
19 While we ensure that the fiscal year ends are prior to the elections, studies in political science have found that the 
relationship between fiscal policy and elections is not very sensitive to the definition of timing used. See for 
example, Alesina et al. [1998].  
20 These statistics are skewed downward as a few of our state years have 0 balances (or small negative balances) in 
their general fund.  We exclude these observations when calculating these statistics.    
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with the maximum of 14.6%. When considering these statistics, it is important to note that a 
large portion (most of the time around 50%) of a state’s liabilities come from its long-term debt, 
such as bonds and notes payable, which are not easy to manipulate. If we instead scale the 
liability for compensated absences by total liabilities after excluding bonds that are directly 
attributable to the primary government, we find that the percentage of compensated absences 
liability doubles. That is, compensated absences on average account for 6% of a state’s non-bond 
related liabilities and with a maximum of 17%.21 
We find that compensated absences are on average decreasing during the sample period. 
The average change in compensated absences scaled by total assets is -0.02%. The average 
monthly payrolls for full time state employees are $298 million dollars, which is on average 1% 
of the state’s total assets. We also find payrolls decreasing during sample period. The average 
annual change in full-time employee monthly payrolls is -0.03% which is of similar magnitude 
as the change in compensated absences. During our sample period the average growth in states’ 
GDP per capita is around 4% and an average state’s total assets is about $32 billion dollars. 
4.4 Measuring the discretionary portion of the compensated absence liability 
Table 2 reports the results of equation (1). The coefficient on ΔFTPayroll is 0.907 and is 
statistically significant, suggesting that a $1 dollar increase in the change in monthly full-time 
employee payrolls is associated with an 91 cent increase in the annual change in compensated 
absences. Our two proxies for policy changes on compensated absence benefits are both 
statistically significant. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient on Policy is negative, 
suggesting that when the state government uses furloughs or early retirements to close budget 
gaps, they may also cut the benefits on compensated absences. The coefficient on 
                                                 
21 When calculating this statistic we only exclude General Obligation Bonds, Revenue Bonds, and Other Bonds that 
were listed as direct obligations of the primary government entity. The fact that we only exclude these three types of 
bonds understates the relative size of the compensated absences account.  
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UnexpectedComp is positive, consistent with the expectation that shocks, such as a policy 
change, to employee salary tend to also affect compensated absences benefits. We find that state 
GDP growth and government size are generally not associated with changes in compensated 
absences.  
The model explains a significant portion of the variation in ΔCA, with an R2 of 0.62. The 
strength of the results is reassuring in that our independent variables control for the factors 
determining changes in compensated absences and that the residuals are reasonable estimates for 
the discretionary components of ΔCA.  
5 Gubernatorial Elections and Discretionary Change in Compensated Absences  
5.1 Research design 
 We hypothesize that a state’s accounting decisions are affected by its desire to influence 
the prospects of a gubernatorial election. In an election year, a state government has incentives to 
improve the financial look of the state by reducing liabilities. We predict that the accumulation 
of compensated absences liability is abnormally small in an election year. Moreover, the 
abnormal change in compensated absences is conditional on the state’s budget restrictiveness, 
financial health, audit quality, and CAFR preparer independence. Our main regression model 
takes the form: 
Discretionary ΔCA = β0 + β1Election + β2Election*WeakBBR + β3Election*FinancialHealth + 
β4Election* AuditorIndep + β5Election*PreparerIndep + β6WeakBBR 
+β7FinancialHealth + β8AuditorIndep + β9PreparerIndep + ε             (2) 
 
We expect that states will discretionarily accumulate smaller compensated absences 
liability in the fiscal year right before a gubernatorial election and hence, a negative β1. We 
further expect the accounting manipulation on compensated absences would be mitigated by 
weak balance budget requirements, strong financial health, high audit quality, and high preparer 
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independence. We expect the coefficients on the interaction terms Election*WeakBBR, 
Election*FinancialHealth, Election*AuditorIndep, and Election*PreparerIndep to be positive 
(i.e., β2, β3, β4 and β5 all > 0). 
To measure the restrictiveness of balance budget requirements, we follow Hou and 
Smith’s (2006) framework for state budget and identify five most restrictive budgetary rules:  
(1) There is an explicit limit regarding the amount of debt that the state may accumulate. 
Without this restriction, the state government can simply take on additional short-term 
debt during a budgetary cycle and use the borrowing to pass a balanced budget.22 
(2) The governor is required to sign a balanced budget bill. Without this restriction, it is 
possible for the governor to submit a balanced budget, have the legislature pass the 
balanced budget, and then have the final budget unbalanced by including deficit 
spending. 
(3) The state has limitations regarding supplementary appropriations. Supplementary 
appropriations are expenditures that tend to occur after the passage of the final budget. A 
state lacking this restriction can pass a balanced budget, and then employ supplementary 
appropriations to result in an unbalanced budget. 
(4) Explicit restrictions that prevent deficit spending within a specific budgetary cycle. 
(5) The budget must be balanced at the end of a fiscal year (or biennium), so that no deficits 
can be carried over to the next budgetary cycle.  
 
We define a state as having a weak balanced budget restriction (i.e., WeakBBR = 1) if it does not 
have any of the above anti-deficit rules.  
 We measure a state’s expected financial health using the ratio of forecasted end-of-year 
total balances to forecasted general expenditures. Total balances are the sum of the general fund 
balances and the state’s budget stabilization fund balances (i.e., rainy day fund balances). Total 
balances represent the cushion a state has when facing unexpected budget shortfalls. Both the 
NASBO and textbooks on governmental accounting suggest that scaled measures of general 
account surpluses (total balances) are common measures used to evaluate a state’s fiscal health.23 
                                                 
22 It is very rare that states are legally allowed to issue long-term debt to cover the budget gap. (The only 2 cases we 
are aware of are Louisiana in 1988 and Connecticut in 1991). States have more freedom in issuing short-term debt, 
so the stricter balanced budget requirement constraints states from borrowing short-term to make up the budget gap.      
23 For example, Ives et al. [2008] suggest using “budgetary cushion” ratios, such as unreserved fund balances to total 
revenues to analyze general-purpose government financial health.  
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The conventional rule of thumb is that to ensure a state has enough reserves its total balances 
should be greater than 5% of expenditures (NASBO Fiscal Survey of States).  
We regard a state auditor to have higher independence and to conduct higher quality 
audits if the chief auditor is elected, rather than appointed (i.e., AuditorIndep = 1). Similarly, we 
consider a state's financial statement preparer to be more independent if the chief controller is 
elected, rather than appointed (i.e., PreparerIndep = 1). 
5.2 Univariate results 
The first three rows of Table 1 Panel C provide descriptive information on Discretionary 
ΔCA. By construction, Discretionary ΔCA is mean 0. When we separate the sample into 
gubernatorial election years (N = 92) and non-gubernatorial election years (N = 267), we find 
that the Discretionary ΔCA is, on average, lower in the election years than in the non-election 
years (-0.563 versus 0.194, p-value < 0.01). In fact, Discretionary ΔCA in election years has 
smaller minimum, median, first quartile, and third quartile values than Discretionary ΔCA in 
non-election years (untabulated). Given the mean of the total assets is $31,622 million, state 
governments on average abnormally accumulate $23.9 million dollars less compensated 
absences in an election year relative to a non-election year.  
To put the magnitude of the manipulation into perspective, we calculate the amount of 
money state governments need to raise to restore fiscal soundness in an election year. Following 
NASBO, we define a state as fiscally healthy if its total balances are greater than 5% of its 
expenditures (i.e., FinancialHealth > 0.05). Of the 92 election-years, 42 expect not to be able to 
meet the 5% benchmark and their average Discretionary ΔCA is $24.3 million. To reach the 5% 
target, the average amount of money they need to raise is $289 million dollars. The manipulation 
in compensated absences is about 8% of the $289 million dollars these states need.  
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In Figure 1 we plot the discretionary component of ΔCA in event time, where year t = 0 is 
the fiscal year right before the election.24 Figure 1 shows that there is a dip in the discretionary 
component of ΔCA during the election year and Discretionary ΔCA increases in the years after 
the election. Both Figure 1 and the univariate results provide support for the hypothesis that state 
governments opportunistically accrue less compensated absences before a gubernatorial election. 
The bottom half of Table 1 Panel C provides descriptive information on the variables 
used in the main regression. We find that 13% of our sample has weak balance budget rules. The 
average forecasted reserves are 8.3% of forecasted expenditures. Almost 38% of the state chief 
auditors are elected and 18% of the chief controllers are elected. 
5.3 Regression results 
Table 3 presents the regression results for equation (2). The first specification reinforces 
our preliminary univariate findings that the discretionary accrual of compensated absences is 
abnormally small in a gubernatorial election year. Comparing the significant negative coefficient 
(-0.757, t-statistic of -2.685) on Election with the intercept, the result suggests that Discretionary 
ΔCA decreases almost 4 times in an election year relative to a non-election year.  
 In the second specification, we include WeakBBR, FinancialHealth, AuditorIndep, 
PreparerIndep, and their interaction terms with Election to investigate whether the election year 
accounting manipulation is conditional on the incumbent’s incentives and ability to manipulate. 
The positive coefficient on the interaction term Election x WeakBBR (1.091, t-statistic of 2.914) 
suggests that the decrease in Discretionary ΔCA in an election year is mitigated if the state has 
weak balanced budget restrictions. In fact for states with weak balanced budget restrictions, we 
do not find accounting management in compensated absences in an election year. The sum of the 
                                                 
24 Vermont and New Hampshire hold gubernatorial elections every 2 years. So we plot their discretionary 
component of ΔCA over (-1, 0). 
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coefficients on Election and Election x WeakBBR is not statistically different from 0 (p-value = 
0.24). This finding suggests that since during election years states are less likely to cut spending 
or increase taxes, states with strict anti-deficit provisions are under more pressure to meet the 
budget and thus, have even stronger incentives to manage accounting numbers. 
We also find that states expected to be in better financial health are less likely to 
manipulate compensated absences prior to an election. The coefficient on Election x 
FinancialHealth is positive and significant (1.518, t-statistic of 1.68). Finally, we find that the 
coefficients on Election x AuditorIndep and Election x PreparerIndep are both positive and 
significant, suggesting both state auditors and state financial statements preparers can curb the 
accounting manipulation. However, both the sums of the coefficients on Election and Election x 
AuditorIndep and on Election and Election x PreparerIndep are statistically smaller than 0 (both 
have p-values < 0.01). This result suggests that while state governments’ ability to play 
accounting tricks is weakened by independent state auditors and controllers, independent state 
auditors and controllers cannot fully curtail the accounting management.  
We do not have any predictions on the main effects of WeakBBR, FinancialHealth, 
AuditorIndep, and PreparerIndep on the manipulation of compensated absences. The negative 
coefficient on WeakBBR in column (2) suggests that states with loose budget restrictions tend to 
accumulate less compensated absences liabilities during non-election periods. This result is 
likely due to the difficulty we have in measuring the extent to which balanced budget restrictions 
are binding. A lot of balanced budget requirements are based on judicial interpretations and 
political expectations, and there is generally no legal mechanism to force compliance with a 
balanced budget. The General Accounting Office’s 1993 report states that “some balanced 
budget requirements are based on interpretations of state constitutions and statues rather than on 
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an explicit statement that the state must have a balanced budget.” Furthermore, the requirements 
for balanced budgets do not impose legal penalties for failure to do so and thus, it is hard to 
capture how rigorous balanced budget restrictions are. Given this issue, WeakBBR may be 
measured with error and hence, we suggest the reader interpret the results on the balanced budget 
variable with caution.  
 Overall Table 3 provides evidence which suggests that states make accounting choices to 
accumulate relatively lower compensated absences prior to a gubernatorial election. We also find 
that variation in the independence of the state auditor and controller, the fiscal performance of 
the state, and the leniency of the balanced budget requirements mitigate these incentives. 
6.  Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
While we find that the compensated absences liability is statistically lower in election 
years, this could be due to employees using up their leaves rather than accounting manipulation. 
For example, employees may use up their leaves in fear of a potential policy change in their paid 
time leave. The lower account balance can also be due to state governments cutting employee 
benefits to reduce the impression that they are overpaying their employees. We conduct several 
analyses to rule out these alternative explanations.  
Concerns of a policy change in the granting or use of compensated absences is more 
likely to arise from employees without union protection. State governments cannot retroactively 
cut benefits for union employees under a contract. Moreover, any changes to benefits in future 
contracts must be negotiated as part of each union renegotiation process. Compensated absences 
are a major employee benefit and often included in great detail in union contracts.25 If our results 
                                                 
25 We obtained union contracts for some of the states.  In each contract, there are always provisions protected the 
amount of sick leave, vacation leave, and other compensatory leaves available to the state employees.  
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are driven by employees’ concerns about losing their leave, we should observe a mitigating 
effect from states with strong union representation. 
 We collect state employee union membership and union coverage data from 
unionstats.gsu.edu, which compiled the data from the Current Population Survey (Hirsch and 
Macpherson [2003]). UnionMembership is the proportion of public sector state employees who 
are members of a labor union or of an employee association similar to a union. UnionCoverage 
is the proportion of public sector state employees who are covered by a union or employee 
association contract. Table 4 columns (1) and (2) report the results after including these variables 
in the model. The results do not support the hypothesis that employees use up their benefits in 
anticipation of a change in policy. Neither Election x UnionMembership nor Election x 
UnionCoverage is significant.26  
In column (3), we replace the union variables with public sector collective bargaining 
power. States allow collective bargaining tend to pay higher wages and are less likely to cut 
employee benefits such as compensated absences.27 We collect information on collective 
bargaining laws from the NBER Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set. 
CollectiveBargain = 1 if the state gives state employees “right to meet and confer,” ”duty to 
bargain implied,” or “duty to bargain explicit.” Using collective bargaining as an alternative 
proxy still does not provide any support for the alternative explanation that employees use up 
                                                 
26 In addition to union membership and union coverage, we also consider whether the state has a right-to-work law 
as an alternative proxy for union strength. A right-to-work law protects employees’ right to decide whether or not to 
join a union. Unions in states without such a law are often viewed as more powerful, because they can force 
employees to unionize. Using no right-to-work law to proxy for union strength still provides no support for the 
alternative explanation that employees using up compensated absences in anticipation of a policy change.  
27 Consistent with labor economics literature, we find that states with collective bargaining allow employees to drive 
up wages. The average (median) annual full-time state employee wage is $48,495 ($47,759) dollars for states allow 
collective bargaining. This is higher than the average (median) annual wage of $41,573 ($40,748) for states who do 
not allow collective bargaining (p-value < 0.0001 for both the mean and median differences). 
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their compensated absences prior to an election. The coefficient on Election x CollectiveBargain 
is not statistically significant.  
 In the final column of Table 4, we consider the possibility that accounting reports are 
used to evaluate the compensation practices of the state government. It is possible that in an 
election year the incumbent wants to reduce the impression that the state government is 
overpaying their employees, and thus accumulates abnormally low compensated absences. This 
explanation makes the hypothesis two sided, resulting in a mitigating effect from states with a 
larger proportion of its citizens employed by the state government. That is, in general voters 
would not want to see their tax dollars being used to over compensate state employees, unless 
they are state employees. We denote HiEmployment = 1 if the ratio of the state full-time 
employees to the state population is greater than sample median. Column (4) shows that the 
coefficient on Election x HiEmployment is not statistically significant (t-statistic of 1.13). The 
fact that our results do not vary cross-sectionally with the level of state employment provides no 
support for the alternative compensation hypothesis.  
We conduct several additional untabulated sensitivity analyses. First, we investigate 
whether our results are sensitive to the incumbent’s decision to stand for a reelection. Although, 
in the vast majority of the elections in our sample, either the incumbent runs again, or a member 
of his cabinet (or the lieutenant governor) runs, the incentives for the incumbent to manipulate 
accounting numbers are likely to be larger if he himself enters the race and his election fate is at 
stake. We include Election x Incumbent as an additional variable in the regression. We find that 
the coefficient on Election x Incumbent is not significant (t-statistic of -0.03). This result 
suggests that accounting manipulation is used to maintain current party’s governorship, whether 
incumbents run or not has no association with the extent of manipulation. 
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We also consider the political affiliation of state auditors. State auditors belonging to a 
different party from the governor may have more incentives to hinder the incumbent governor’s 
adoption of favorable accounting treatment during an election year. However, we are only able to 
observe elected auditors’ political affiliations. So we create a variable Auditor_SameParty to 
equal 0 for appointed auditors, 1 for elected auditors who belong to the same party as the 
governor, and 2 for elected auditors who belong to a different party from the governor. Our 
results on auditor independence are consistent with those reported in our primary analysis. The 
coefficient on Election x Auditor_SameParty is positive and significant (t-statistic = 1.72).  
Finally, we re-estimate Discretionary ΔCA in equation (1) using a set of rolling 
regressions by pooling all the data available up to the current year t. For example, to estimate 
Discretionary ΔCA in 2001, we will only use data in 2001 and to estimate the variable in 2002, 
we will use data in 2001 and 2002, etc. This rolling approach has the advantage that the 
estimation of the discretionary accruals does not include forward looking data. However, it also 
suffers the disadvantage that in the early years, we have few observations to estimate 
Discretionary ΔCA, and hence our estimates may be inaccurate. When we use this alternative 
approach, we find our results are not sensitive to this research design choice. We also repeat the 
analysis using population as an alternative deflator and find qualitatively similar results.28 
7. Supplemental Tests 
A final concern with our analysis on compensated absences is that our results could be 
driven by correlated omitted variables, which cause the compensated absence balance to appear 
abnormally small in an election year.  While our cross-sectional and robustness analyses reduce 
this concern, we conclude the paper by examining another employee related liability account, the 
                                                 
28 Note that when we use population as the deflator, the mitigating effect from good fiscal health is not statistically 
significant.  
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unfunded pension liability (UAAL). We focus on unfunded pension liability because this account 
balance is also large enough that it may be subject to manipulation. Moreover, the unfunded 
pension liability is not affected by employees using up their compensated leaves and it is also 
harder to change policies on employee pension benefits. Therefore, if we find evidence of 
discretion in this account, then it further reduces the probability that we are capturing a 
correlated omitted variable in our main tests. 
GASB Statement No. 27, Accounting for Pensions by State and Local Governmental 
Employers, provides guidance for state and local governments on how to account for their 
unfunded pension liability. At a very high level, the unfunded pension liability represents the 
cumulative difference between the state’s contribution to the pension program and the actuarial 
determined annual required contributions (ARC). In state governments, the unfunded pension 
liability is primarily associated with the state’s defined benefit plans as most states still do not 
offer defined contribution plans.29 Similar to the compensated absence account, there is a host of 
accounting choices that states must make in order to determine the value of their unfunded 
pension obligations.  For example, to determine the ARC, the state government must make 
actuarial assumptions regarding employees’ mortality, withdrawal from the pension system, and 
retirement dates, and they also must make assumptions about the expected rates of return on plan 
assets and projected salary increases, etc. McMahon [2011] states that governmental accounting 
rules for pensions provide governments with significant accounting discretion, concluding that, 
“lenient accounting standards have allowed public pension systems across the country to build 
                                                 
29 A survey by Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that about 80% of workers in state and local governments enroll 
in defined benefit pension plans and only about 20% of the workers enroll in define contribution plans (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics [2008]).  
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up enormous unfunded liabilities, based on unrealistic assumptions about future investment 
returns.”30 
To conduct our tests, we collect state sponsored defined benefit pension plan data from 
Boston College Center for Retirement Research and crosscheck these data using the information 
from the National Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA).31 If a state has 
more than 1 plan, we aggregate all the plans into the state level. To measure the discretion 
included in unfunded pension, we model the “normal account balance” as a function of actuarial 
assumptions related to the plan’s assets and liability, the performance of the plan investments, 
the plan’s asset allocations, the payroll covered by the plan, and the state’s contribution to the 
ARC. The model takes the form: 
UAALi,t = c0 + c1WageAssumpi,t + c2ReturnAssumpi,t + c3InflationAssumpi,t  
+ c4Equityi,t + c5Bondi,t + c6Realestatei,t + c7Returni,t + c8ARCPaidi,t + 
c9Payrolli,t  + εi,t                                                                                        (3) 
 
UAAL is the unfunded actuarial accrued liability scaled by primary government total assets. 
WageAssump is the actuarial assumption of the total wage growth for employees age 40 and/or 
with 10 years of service. ReturnAssump is the actuarial assumption of the long-term investment 
return of plan assets. InflationAssump is the actuarial assumption of the inflation rate. All three 
actuarial assumption variables are in percentages. Equity is the percentage of investments in 
equities. Bond is the percentage of investments in fixed income. Realestate is the percentage of 
investments in real estate assets. Return is the percentage of 1-year investment return on the total 
portfolio of investments. ARCPaid is the percentage of the ARC paid. Payroll is the payroll 
covered by the pension plan scaled by primary government total assets. For actuarial 
                                                 
30 See E.J. McMahon “A Cure or a Bandage?” New York Times December 7, 2011 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/06/will-new-york-citys-pensions-be-cut/on-pensions-a-cure-or-a-
bandage  
31 We thank Keith Brainard at NASRA’s Public Fund Survey for kindly providing us the pension data from 2001-
2009. 
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assumptions, asset allocations, investment returns, and the percent of state contributions, we take 
the average across the plans within a state if the state sponsors more than 1 pension plan. Since 
the actuarial valuation dates of the state pensions tend to not in sync with the state fiscal year end 
dates, we further ensure that the actuarial valuation dates are prior to November (the general 
election dates).  
Table 1 Panel B reports the descriptive information on the variables used in estimating 
equation (3). The scale of the unfunded pension liability is large. For our sample, it is on average 
close to 6 billion dollars, which is about 90 times of an average state’s general fund balance and 
almost 20 times when including the budget stabilization fund in the calculation. We find that 
unfunded pension is on average about 24% of a state government’s total assets and about 57% of 
its total liability. This figure doubles to 114% when we exclude bonds from liability.  
We find that on average pension plans assume a 5.7% growth rate for employee wage, a 
rate of 8% for plan investment return, and a 3.6% inflation rate. Consistent with the observation 
in Novy-Marx and Rauh [2009], we find that state sponsored pension funds largely invest in 
risky assets. For example, on average a pension plan invests 58% in equities and only 28% in 
fixed income. The realized return in the sample period is about 6%, lower than the actuarial 
assumption of 8%. We find that on average states contribute 95% of the required contribution 
and the payroll covered by the plan is about 10 billion dollars, 32% of the state government’s 
total assets.32  
Table 5 Panel A reports the results of equation (3). The coefficient on Payroll is positive 
and significant, suggesting that pension plans are more likely to be underfunded if the covered 
employee salary is high. Besides Payroll, the coefficients on WageAssump, ReturnAssump, and 
                                                 
32 Note that FTPayroll is smaller than Payroll. This is because FTPayroll (monthly base) only includes full time 
employees work in the state government. In contrast, Payroll includes employees work outside of the state 
government (such as teachers, policy, and firefighters) but their pension plans are sponsored by the state. 
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ARCPaid are also significant. We are cautious in interpreting these coefficients as these factors 
are all likely to be endogenously determined. For example, ReturnAssump is positive, suggesting 
that when the states assume high investment returns they tend to have higher unfunded pension 
liability. This result could be due to the fact that states assuming high returns tend to be those 
with funding problems and they hope to use the high actuarial return assumptions to reduce the 
underfunded liability.  
The residuals from equation (3) are our estimates for the accounting discretion state 
governments have used on unfunded pension. In Table 1 Panel C, we provide descriptive 
information on Discretionary UAAL. By construction, Discretionary UAAL has a mean of 0. 
Similar to Discretionary ΔCA, we find that the distribution of Discretionary UAAL has smaller 
values in election years than in non-election years. Specifically, in election years Discretionary 
UAAL has smaller mean, minimum, median, third quartile, and maximum values. Given the 
mean of the total assets of $31,622 million, we find that state governments abnormally recognize 
$474 million dollars less unfunded pension liability in an election year relative to a non-election 
year.  
Table 5 Panel B reports the results of the effects of elections on unfunded pension 
liability. These results are similar to the results on compensated absences liability. Specifically, 
we find that unfunded pension liability is abnormally small in an election year as indicated by the 
negative coefficient on Election (-0.047, t-statistic of -1.91). The positive coefficient on Election 
x FinancialHealth (0.096, t-statistic of 2.11) suggests that the accounting management on 
unfunded pension decreases if a state expects to have a strong fiscal condition. We also find 
evidence that independent auditors and controllers can curb the accounting manipulation in 
pension as indicated by the positive coefficients on Election x AuditorIndep and Election x 
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PreparerIndep. In contrast to compensated absences, we do not find a state’s budget flexibility 
affects unfunded pension liability in an election year (the coefficient on Election x WeakBBR is 
insignificant). As we discuss above, the mixed results on this variable are likely to be attributable 
to the difficulty in measuring the extent to which states have balanced budget requirements so 
that the variable can be a weak proxy. 
Overall Table 5 provides findings consistent with earlier results that politicians manage 
accounting numbers prior to an election. The fact that we are able to find similar results in 
another account mitigates the concerns that our main findings on compensated absences are 
driven by omitted variables.  
8. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates whether state governments manage accounting numbers prior to 
gubernatorial elections. We examine state governments’ accounting choices for liabilities 
associated with state work force and find that state governments discretionarily accumulate lower 
compensated absences liability in election years, especially if the government is under strict 
budgetary restrictions, or is expected to have bad financial condition. Independent state auditors 
and controllers can curb such accounting manipulation. In supplemental tests, we find similar 
evidence that state governments recognize lower unfunded pension liability in election years. 
However, we do not find such manipulation related to the state’s budget flexibility, and so we 
caution the interpretation of this variable.  
 The paper contributes to the accounting choice literature along a number of dimensions.  
First, given the heightened interest in the financial wellbeing of state governments, our paper is 
timely, in that it examines factors affecting the outputs of the state financial reporting process.  
Our paper also adds to the accounting choice literature by studying how political processes affect 
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the outputs of U.S. states financial reporting systems. While other studies have investigated 
accounting choice for state and local governments (e.g., Evans and Patton [1983], Baber [1983], 
Baber and Sen [1984]), this paper is the first attempt to identify the manipulation of specific 
accounts (compensated absences and unfunded pension) and provide evidence that the discretion 
used in these accounts is more evident in an election year.   
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Appendix I 
 
ARCPaid = the percentage of the ARC paid by the state; 
   
AuditorIndep  = dummy variable which equals 1 if the state chief auditor is elected by the citizens, 
0 otherwise; 
   
Auditor_SameParty = ranges from 0 to 2 and is equal to 0 if the state chief auditor is appointed, equal to 
1 if the state chief auditor is elected but belongs to the same political party as the 
governor, equal to 2 if the state chief auditor is elected and belongs to a different 
party from the governor; 
   
Bond = the percentage of pension plan investments in fixed income; 
   
CA = primary government compensated absences liability; 
   
ΔCA = annual change in primary government compensated absences scaled by the 
primary government total assets; 
   
CollectiveBargain = dummy variable which equals 1 if the state gives state employees “right to meet 
and confer,” “duty to bargain implied,” or “duty to bargain explicit,” 0 otherwise; 
   
Discretionary ΔCA = the discretionary component of the annual change in primary government 
compensated absences scaled by the primary government total assets; 
   
Discretionary UAAL = the discretionary component of the annual unfunded actuarial accrued liability 
scaled by the primary government total assets; 
   
FinancialHealth  [expected ending general fund balance + expected budget stabilization fund 
balance] / expected general expenditures; 
   
FTPayroll = average base monthly pay for full-time state employees; 
   
ΔFTPayroll  annual change in average monthly pay for full-time state employees scaled by 
primary government total assets; 
   
Election = dummy variable which equals 1 if a gubernatorial election occurs during the year, 
0 otherwise; 
   
Equity = the percentage of pension plan investments in equities; 
   
GrowthGDP = the growth in the state’s Gross Domestic Product per capita; 
   
HiEmployment = dummy variable which equals 1 if the state-year’s ratio of the state full-time 
employees to the state population is greater than sample median, 0 otherwise; 
   
Incumbent = dummy variable which equals 1 if the candidate for the governor election is the 
current governor, 0 otherwise;  
   
InflationAssump = the actuarial assumption of the inflation rate; 
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LogTA = the natural logarithm of the primary government total assets; 
   
Payroll = the payroll covered by the state sponsored pension plan scaled by the primary 
government total assets; 
   
Policy = dummy variable which equals 1 if the state uses furloughs or early retirements to 
reduce budget gaps, 0 otherwise; 
   
PreparerIndep = dummy variable which equals 1 if the preparer of the CAFR is elected by the 
citizens, 0 otherwise; 
   
Realestate = the percentage of pension plan investments in real estate assets; 
   
Return = the percentage of 1-year investment return on the total portfolio of pension plan 
investments; 
   
ReturnAssump = the actuarial assumption of the long-term investment return of pension plan 
assets; 
   
TA = primary government total assets; 
   
TL = primary government total liabilities; 
   
UAAL = unfunded actuarial accrued liability of state sponsored pension plans scaled by 
primary government total assets; 
   
UnexpectedComp = the residual from a regression of the change in full time payroll on the change in 
the number of full time employees (both variables scaled by primary government 
total assets); 
   
UnionCoverage = the proportion of public sector state employees who are covered by a union or 
employee association contract; 
   
UnionMembership = the proportion of public sector state employees who are members of a labor union 
or of an employee association similar to a union; 
   
WageAssump = the actuarial assumption of the total wage growth for employees age 40 and/or 
with 10 years of service;  
   
WeakBBR = dummy variable which equals 1 if the state does not have any balanced budget 
restriction out of the 5 restrictive rules, 0 otherwise. 
 40 
Figure 1: Discretionary Compensated Absences Liability around Elections 
 
This figure graphs discretionary changes in compensated absences liability around a gubernatorial election year (t = 0). Discretionary 
ΔCA is scaled by multiplying 1,000. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in estimating the discretionary component of changes in compensated 
absences liability. Panel B reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in estimating the discretionary component of unfunded 
pension liability. Panel C reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in analyzing the effects of gubernatorial elections on 
compensated absences liability and unfunded pension liability. All variables are defined in Appendix I.  
 
Panel A: Variables used in estimating discretionary changes in compensated absences 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Compensated absence liability         
CA (in millions) 359 336 197 411 
CA / TA 359 0.011 0.010 0.006 
CA / TL 359 0.030 0.026 0.019 
CA / TL excluding Bonds 358 0.060 0.049 0.038 
CA / General Fund Balance 314 4.828 0.750 23.065 
CA / (General Fund Balance + Budget Stabilization Fund Balance) 344 1.438 0.400 7.925 
ΔCA (scaled by TA) 359 -0.0002 -0.00008 0.003 
Other variables         
FTPayroll (in millions) 359 298 225 305 
FTPayroll / TA 359 0.011 0.010 0.005 
ΔFTPayroll (scaled by TA) 359 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.003 
Policy 359 0.0724 0 0.2595 
UnexpectedComp 359 0 -0.079 0.435 
GrowthGDP 359 0.0419 0.0390 0.0243 
TA (in millions) 359 31,622 22,688 34,640 
 
Panel B: Variables used in estimating discretionary unfunded pension liability 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Unfunded pension liability         
UAAL (in millions) 345 5,977 3,208 10,116 
UAAL / TL 345 0.571 0.457 0.607 
UAAL / TL excluding Bonds 345 1.135 0.850 1.467 
UAAL / General Fund Balance 301 90.251 12.600 571.813 
UAAL / (General Fund Balance + Budget Stabilization Fund Balance) 330 18.562 6.679 125.706 
UAAL / TA 345 0.238 0.179 0.277 
Other variables         
WageAssump (%) 345 5.662 5.630 0.798 
ReturnAssump (%) 345 7.992 8 0.348 
InflationAssump (%) 345 3.623 3.500 0.596 
Equity (%) 345 58.291 59.500 8.362 
Bond (%) 345 27.747 26.397 7.603 
Realestate (%) 345 5.138 5.043 3.969 
Return (%) 345 6.185 8.850 9.626 
ARCPaid (%) 345 95.321 100 50.320 
Payroll (in millions) 345 10,325 6,792 12,298 
Payroll / TA 345 0.323 0.308 0.145 
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Panel C: Variables used in analyzing effects of gubernatorial elections on compensated absences liability and unfunded 
pension liability 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Discretionary accounting choices     
Discretionary ΔCA x 1000 359 0 -0.043 1.951 
  Election = 0 267 0.194 -0.037 1.729 
  Election = 1 92 -0.563 -0.062 2.410 
Discretionary UAAL 345 0 -0.016 0.229 
  Election = 0 252 0.005 -0.013 0.234 
  Election = 1 93 -0.010 -0.021 0.218 
Other variables     
Election 359 0.256 0 0.437 
WeakBBR 359 0.134 0 0.341 
FinancialHealth 354 0.083 0.049 0.145 
AuditorIndep 359 0.379 0 0.486 
PreparerIndep 359 0.181 0 0.386 
Election x WeakBBR 359 0.036 0 0.187 
Election x FinancialHealth 354 0.023 0 0.087 
Election x AuditorIndep 359 0.100 0 0.301 
Election x PreparerIndep 359 0.045 0 0.207 
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Table 2: Discretionary Changes in Compensated Absences Liability  
 
This table reports the regression results of equation (1) 
 
ΔCAi,t = α0 + α1ΔFTPayrolli,t + α2Policyi,t + α3UnexpectedCompi,t + α4GrowthGDPi,t + α5LogTAi,t + εi,t 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix I. p-values are one tailed for variables with predicted signs and two tailed for variables without 
predicted signs. t-statistics are in brackets and are calculated based on heteroscedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and 
year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable = ΔCA x 1000 
Intercept 0.223 
 [0.146] 
ΔFTPayroll (+) 0.907*** 
 [17.194] 
Policy (-) -0.340*** 
 [-4.466] 
UnexpectedComp (+) 0.445*** 
 [2.914] 
GrowthGDP (+) -2.211 
 [-0.488] 
LogTA -0.001 
 [-0.017] 
  
Observations 359 
Adjusted R2 0.62 
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Gubernatorial Elections and Discretionary Changes in Compensated Absences Liability 
 
This table reports the regression results of equation (2): 
 
Discretionary ΔCA = β0 + β1Election + β2Election*WeakBBR + β3Election*FinancialHealth + β4Election* AuditorIndep + 
β5Election*PreparerIndep + β6WeakBBR + β7FinancialHealth + β8AuditorIndep + β9PreparerIndep 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix I. p-values are one tailed for variables with predicted signs and two tailed for variables without 
predicted signs. t-statistics are in brackets and are calculated based on heteroscedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and 
year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
  Dependent: Discretionary ΔCA x 1000 
  [1] [2] 
Intercept 0.194 0.347 
  [1.182] [1.556] 
Election (-) -0.757*** -1.487*** 
  [-2.685] [-2.757] 
Election x WeakBBR (+)  1.091*** 
   [2.914] 
Election x FinancialHealth(+)  1.518** 
   [1.682] 
Election x AuditorIndep (+)  0.834** 
   [2.064] 
Election x PreparerIndep (+)  0.718*** 
   [3.225] 
WeakBBR  -0.590*** 
   [-3.919] 
FinancialHealth  -0.883 
   [-1.561] 
AuditorIndep  0.031 
   [0.185] 
PreparerIndep  -0.091 
   [-0.383] 
    
Observations 359 354 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analyses on Discretionary Changes in Compensated Absences Liability 
 
This table reports sensitivity analyses on unions, collective bargaining laws, and the employment of state government. All variables are defined in 
Appendix I. p-values are one tailed for variables with predicted signs and two tailed for variables without predicted signs. t-statistics are in brackets 
and are calculated based on heteroscedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Discretionary ΔCA x 1000 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Intercept 0.486 0.477 0.369 0.441** 
  [1.612] [1.486] [1.614] [2.637] 
Election (-) -1.394*** -1.383*** -1.443*** -1.780*** 
  [-2.771] [-2.561] [-3.306] [-2.937] 
Election x WeakBBR (+) 1.110*** 1.113*** 1.096*** 1.065*** 
  [2.672] [2.594] [2.868] [2.764] 
Election x FinancialHealth(+) 1.558* 1.564* 1.555* 1.187** 
  [1.501] [1.483] [1.316] [2.078] 
Election x AuditorIndep (+) 0.827** 0.833** 0.844** 0.860** 
  [2.051] [2.053] [1.867] [1.757] 
Election x PreparerIndep (+) 0.726*** 0.724*** 0.714*** 0.866** 
  [3.565] [3.738] [3.339] [1.840] 
Election x UnionMembership (+) -0.272    
  [-0.251]    
Election x UnionCoverage (+)  -0.273   
   [-0.246]   
Election x CollectiveBargain (+)   -0.083  
    [-0.129]  
Election x HiEmployment (+)    0.565 
     [1.128] 
WeakBBR -0.586*** -0.585*** -0.596*** -0.607*** 
  [-3.942] [-3.921] [-4.087] [-3.048] 
FinancialHealth -0.847 -0.849 -0.857 -0.751 
  [-1.439] [-1.481] [-1.564] [-1.165] 
AuditorIndep 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.026 
  [0.230] [0.229] [0.214] [0.110] 
PreparerIndep -0.066 -0.072 -0.087 -0.134 
  [-0.301] [-0.324] [-0.373] [-0.541] 
UnionMembership -0.448    
  [-0.732]    
UnionCoverage  -0.370   
   [-0.627]   
CollectiveBargain   -0.045  
    [-0.286]  
HiEmployment    -0.189 
     [-0.790] 
Observations 354 354 354 354 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
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Table 5: Supplementary Tests on Unfunded Pension Liability 
 
Panel A reports the regression results of equation (3) 
 
UAALi,t = c0 + c1WageAssumpi,t + c2ReturnAssumpi,t + c3InflationAssumpi,t + c4Equityi,t + c5Bondi,t + c6Realestatei,t + 
c7Returni,t + c8ARCPaidi,t + c9Payrolli,t  + εi,t 
 
Panel B reports the results of the effects of gubernatorial elections on discretionary unfunded pension liability. All variables are 
defined in Appendix I. p-values are one tailed for variables with predicted signs and two tailed for variables without predicted signs. t-
statistics are in brackets and are calculated based on heteroscedastic consistent standard errors clustered by state and year. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Estimation of discretionary UAAL 
 
 Dependent variable = UAAL 
Intercept -1.196 
 [-1.403] 
WageAssump -0.069** 
 [-2.247] 
ReturnAssump 0.180* 
 [1.874] 
InflationAssump -0.092 
 [-1.647] 
Equity 0.004 
 [1.287] 
Bond 0.004 
 [0.900] 
Realestate 0.001 
 [0.260] 
Return 0.004 
 [1.554] 
ARCPaid 0.001** 
 [2.423] 
Payroll 0.864*** 
 [3.573] 
  
Observations 345 
Adjusted R2 0.29 
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Panel B: The effects of gubernatorial elections on discretionary UAAL 
 
  Dependent: Discretionary UAAL 
Intercept 0.051 
  [1.130] 
Election (-) -0.047** 
  [-1.910] 
Election x WeakBBR (+) -0.061 
  [-1.044] 
Election x FinancialHealth(+) 0.096** 
  [2.111] 
Election x AuditorIndep (+) 0.061** 
  [2.215] 
Election x PreparerIndep (+) 0.080** 
  [1.788] 
WeakBBR -0.057 
  [-0.594] 
FinancialHealth -0.179** 
  [-2.636] 
AuditorIndep -0.090* 
  [-1.694] 
PreparerIndep 0.058 
  [0.559] 
   
Observations 345 
Adjusted R2 0.05 
 
